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Abstract. The paper argues that causal systems and spatial patterns are species of the 
same genus, namely pattern, and that a clear view of spatial patterns throws light on 
some aspects of the ontological nature of causal systems. In particular, it is argued that 
all patterns (and systems) depend on a fiat delimitation of something which in itself is a 
unity without borders. Pattern realism is true. 
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Most top-level ontologies in the history of philosophy reckon in some kind of primary 
substance (be it things, events, or something else), properties, and relations, and they have 
some place for space and time. Some other categories like causality and quantity are also 
almost universal in this sense. Very seldom, however, has pattern got a place high up in any 
ontological hierarchy. The aim of this paper is to show that patterns really deserve such a 
place. Of course, patterns are always patterns of something. Therefore, pattern as a category 
cannot be logically basic, but it is important nonetheless. 
In some modem ontologies, systems are given a prominent place. In particular, this is 
true of Mario Bunge's Treatise of Basic Philosophy. The fourth volume of this treatise is 
given the subtitle Ontology II: A World of Systems, and is wholly dedicated to systems. It 
opens with the following two sentences: "Every science studies systems of some kind, 
whether natural (physical, chemical, biological, or social) or artificial (technical). Moreover 
most sciences study nothing but systems"([ I] p. l ). I agree whole-heartedly. However, in my 
view, systems make up some special species of the genus pattern. And that fact and some 
other things are not made clear by Bunge. I will here try to develop further some ideas about 
patterns and systems which I have put forward earlier (see [2) chapters 4, 6, 7, 14, and 15). 
Whatever the practical use of ontologies is, and will be, now when information 
technology revolutionises the world, one of their theoretical uses is to create a bird's eye view 
from which one can correct various forms of myopia. I will try to show that one gets a better 
ontological understanding of some aspects of systems when they are seen as species of the 
category of pattern. The simplest kind of patterns are the spatial patterns, and the ontological 
structure of such patterns is the topic for the first four sections of this paper. Then there are 
short sections on spatiotemporal patterns and causal systems. Whether or not my analysis is 
of direct relevance to the ontology of information systems, I am not able to tell. I look upon 
the world of research as an extensive division of labour which encompasses not only the 
sciences and technology but philosophy as well. Philosophy can interact with both science 
and technology, and I hope that this paper will do so, but the interaction is not spelled out in 
the paper in itself. 
1 The ontological point of departure 
Every pattern has some kind of components. Patterns, as I have said, are always patterns of 
something. Therefore, I need some ontological categories before I can start my discussion of 
patterns. 
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Firstly, I will rely on a rather common-sensical conception of space. Space is a special 
kind of unity which contains things, persons, states of affairs, etc. Problems about the limits 
and structure of space are disregarded. The important thing is that space is not regarded as an 
aggregate of part-spaces. 
Secondly, as primary substances I will rely on ordinary material macro things. 
Thirdly, material things will be assumed to have properties inhering in them. 1 Such 
properties do of course inherit mind-independence from the material things they inhere in. I 
will regard, for instance, shape, size, and mass as surely being such properties. I will also 
regard density, i.e. mass per unit volume, as a real property which can inhere in arbitrary 
small parts of things. When needed, 'P' will be used as a variable for such properties. 
Fourthly, since things and property instances exist in space, there are spatial relations 
both between things and property instances. A property instance can lie beside and be at a 
certain distance from another property instance. Also, it can lie between two other property 
instances. Property instances can stand in all kind of spatial relations. When needed, '-S-' 
will be used as a variable for such relations. 
Fifthly, I want to introduce a special class of relations which I will call property-
grounded relations (see [2] chapter 8). A property-grounded relation is a relation which 
exists thanks to some properties which inhere in the things related. Examples are: '- is larger 
than -', ' - has a size between that of - and -', ' - has another colour hue than -', ' - is brighter 
than -', ' - is heavier than -', 'has a higher density than -', ' - is similar to -', and so on. I do 
not regard spatial location as a property, which means that I do not regard spatial relations 
(e.g. '- is to the left of-', '- is five metres from-', '- is situated between - and -') as 
property-grounded relations . As a variable for binary property-grounded relations, I will use 
'-R-'. 
The ontological difference between relations of type '-R-' and '-S-' is reflected in an 
epistemological difference. If one has knowledge of all the properties which inhere in two 
things a and h ( = the relata), one can derive all the property-grounded relations that exist 
between these relata, but no spatial relation is derivable. For instance, if one knows that a is 
round and h is square, one can derive that a and b have different shapes, but the distance 
between a and b is not derivable. Nor, of course, are spatial relations derivable from 
property-grounded relations. In every statement of the form '- R -', the spatial relations, i.e. 
'- S -', between the relata have been abstncted away (if they have ever been taken into 
account). 
The derivation of property-grounded relations is possible because such relations are 
existentially dependent upon some properties of the relata. Each ?-instance in each relata 
(e.g. round and square) can exist independently of the other, and therefore it can also exist 
independently of the grounded relation (being of different shape). But the grounded relation 
being of different shape cannot possibly exist if there are no property instances of shape. 
The existence of an ontological and an epistemological difference between '-R-' and ' -
S-' is quite consistent with the fact that one certainly can construct location functions for 
things both in relation to real space and in relation to abstract property spaces. In my view, all 
abstract spaces are conceptual constructs but real space is not. The confusing thing is that we 
also can construct a conceptual abstract "spatial space" whose metric mirrors relations in real 
space. 
For some of my later claims about patterns, it is important to note that (in my immanent 
realist opinion) a property-grounded relation exists only in the property instances related. 
Such relations have what might be called scattered instantiation. States of affairs described 
by statements of the form 'aRb' exist only in a and b. My last example of property-grounded 
relation '- has a shape different from-' exists nowhere else than in the things a (which is 
round) and b (which is a square) together; i.e. 'a has another shape than b', if true, is made 
true by facts wholly contained in a and h. Spatial relations behave differently. Statements of 
the form 'aSb' describe states of affairs which contain not only a and b, but also some part of 
space. The statement 'a is five metres from b', if true, is made true by a, b, and the spatial 
distance between them. The fact that a is five metres from bis instantiated in a spatial unity, 
1 I am an immanent realist, but I think that this paper could equally well be written from the point of view of 
a Platonist or a "trope thinker". 
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whereas the fact that a has another shape than b is instantiated in a spatial scatter. 
2 Spatial patterns 
The paradigm examples of patterns are colour patterns. Let us for instance think of the simple 
chequered pattern of the chessboard. In common sense, this pattern of black and white 
squares is thought of as inhering in a thing, the board. Such a pattern would of course not 
exist if there were no shapes. Colours are not enough. In order for a shape to exist it must 
have a border, and the borders of the squares of this pattern are constituted by the different 
colours of the neighbouring squares; the outermost squares have of course one side 
constituted by the encompassing colour. If the colours did not differ, there would be no small 
squares. On the other hand, if there were no shapes nor would there be different colours. A 
colour pattern contains not only the property of colour, necessarily it also contains the 
property of shape. Its components are colours-with-shapes. Generalised, the last two 
statements supply me with my first proposal for one of seven "spatial pattern truths": 
1. A spatial property pattern contains not only the property in question, necessarily it 
also contains shapes; the components of a 5patial property pattern are properties-with-
shapes. 
In the sixty-four squares (i.e. colours-with-shapes) of the chessboard, there are a lot of 
property-grounded relations instantiated. If we name the squares, as in chess, from al to g8, 
then some of these relations can be described by sentences like the following: 'al has the 
same shape as bl'. 'b8 is darker than c2', 'f2 has the same size as d3', and so on. These 
relations exist as scattered in the relata (=colours-with-shapes) they relate. I find it fairly 
obvious that no "sum" of property-grounded relations can be identical with the corresponding 
pattern. Such a "sum" is either a set or an aggregate of property-grounded relations. By 
'aggregate' I mean "a collection of items not held together by bonds, and /which/ therefore 
lacks integrity or unity" ([ 1] pp.3-4 ). If the "sum" is a set it is a non-spatiotemporal entity, 
but the pattern is spatiotemporal, so a set cannot possibly be a pattern. Certainly, an aggregate 
is a spatiotemporal entity, but since by definition aggregates contain no inner unity, such an 
aggregate cannot be a pattern either. A colour pattern is a unity in space, and that unity 
cannot be identical with a number of relations that have scattered instantiation. From these 
remarks the second of my claims about spatial patterns follows: 
2. A spatial property pattern contains a lot of property-grounded relations, but it is not 
identical with a set or an aggregate of such relations. 
My third claim is similar to the second one, but it is not equally obvious. It is about 
spatial relations like 'al is to the left of a2', 'a2 is between al and a3', etc. It says: 
3. A spatial property pattern contains a lot of spatial relations, but it is not identical 
with a set or an aggregate of such relations. 
To repeat, a set (=non-spatiotemporal entity) of relations between colours-with-shapes 
cannot be identical with a colour pattern (=spatioternporal entity). But what about, for 
instance, the aggregate of all the spatial relations between all the sixty-four squares of the 
chessboard pattern? If, in the aggregate in question, we have all relations like 'c4 is in space 
close to b4, c3, c5, d4 ' with their relata (and the property-grounded relations they 
constitute), do we not then have the chessboard pattern as well? In my opinion, we have all 
the parts needed for the pattern, but we do not have the unity necessary for the pattern itself. 
Not even this aggregate has the kind of inner unity which patterns have. An aggregate does 
by definition not take the Gestalt character of a pattern into account. Spatial patterns are 
spatially inclusive unities. 
The last-mentioned feature comes out more clearly in the following thought 
experiment. Let us assume that the sixty-four squares of the chessboard are spread out in 
such a way that each square is one centimetre away from all the neighbouring squares. This 
rearrangement of the components of the old pattern changes a lot of spatial relations, at the 
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same time as it leaves all the old property-grounded relations unchanged. But something more 
happens: New components come into existence. The new pattern necessarily makes all the 
space which now exists between the sixty-four squares into one or several components.2 
Spatial patterns cannot, like for instance property-grounded relations and aggregates, exist as 
scattered. They can only exist in a closed area. If a patch outside a chessboard shall be 
regarded as part of the chessboard pattern, then the space between the patch and the 
chessboard becomes part of the pattern, too. In topological terms, a pattern has to have the 
properties of self-connectedness and 0-connectivity, i.e. the one-piece property and the no-
hole property. The following statement is, I think, true: 
4. A spatial property pattern contains a specific kind of spatial unity. 
According to the four "spatial pattern-truths" stated above, a spatial pattern contains (i) 
properties and properties-with-shapes, (ii) property-grounded relations, (iii) spatial 
relations, and (iv) a specific kind of spatial unity. All these parts are necessary conditions 
for a spatial pattern to exist. (Together with a further requirement, formulated in the seventh 
claim below, they constitute a sufficient condition.) A change in any of the parts will 
normally result in a change of the pattern. A special kind of change occurs when the absolute 
size of all the instances of properties-with-shapes are changed in such a way that their relative 
sizes are not changed. Then we have the same pattern as before, only smaller in size. This 
affords me with yet another claim: 
5. The type-identity of a spatial property pattern is size independent. 
3 The mind-independence of spatial patterns 
There is a possible overall objection to all the five "spatial pattern-truths" that I have 
proposed, namely that they have to be placed within some kind of subject-object distinction. I 
have written, the objection continues, as if colours are mind-independent properties. But 
today we know that perceived and sensed colours exist only in the eye of the beholder. 
Therefore, the objection ends, I have shown nothing whatsoever about mind-independent 
patterns, not even their existence. 
Of course I think that this objection fails and I will, at the same time as I explain why, 
also defend the following representation thesis: 
6. Mind-independent spatial patterns can be represented by mind-dependent spatial 
patterns. 
I will not discuss realism in general, only realism for property patterns. This means 
that I take it for granted that some of the properties which physics talks about do exist in a 
mind-independent world. Density (=mass density), charge density, and electromagnetic field 
strength are three such properties which can constitute property patterns. The first two are 
scalar quantities whereas the third is a vector quantity. There are scalar as well as vector 
patterns, although I will reason only about scalar quantities. 
In order to realise that densities-with-shapes and density patterns can be understood 
realistically, one has to grasp a distinction between real and nominal density. On the one 
hand there is the real density of each compact and homogeneous part of a body with mass, on 
the other hand there is the (nominal) mean value density. In homogeneous things the two 
densities are numerically identical; in heterogeneous things the mean value density always 
differs from the real density of at least some parts. Mean value density is merely a conceptual 
construct. It has to be conceived nominalistically. Real density, however, can be conceived as 
realistically as mass can. As a moving body has in each instant a velocity, a body with mass 
has in each spatial point a density. 
A specific colour hue instance is extended in space until it "meets" an instance of another 
colour hue, or reaches the end of the thing it inheres in. Similarly, a specific real density 
instance is extended in space until it "meets" an instance of another specific real density, or 
reaches the end of the thing it inheres in. All real densities that are not infinitesimally small, 
2 There are of course new spatial relations, too; but that it is not the important point. 
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have such borders and are always instantiated as densities-with-shapes. This means that they 
can be components in spatial property patterns. Between two ( or more) densities-with-
shapes, there are always property-grounded relations as well as spatial relations. As soon as 
the densities-with-shapes come together in such a way that they inherit a spatial unity from 
that part of the space in which they exist, a spatial density pattern comes into existence. 
An example of a density pattern could be a sheet of wood "divided" into sixty-four 
squares, thirty-two with "white" density and thirty-two with "black" density. This mind-
independent chequered density pattern would not be perceptually apprehensible, but it would 
be just as real as the mind-dependent chequered colour pattern. Obviously, the visual 
chessboard pattern can be used to represent the density pattern just described. 
There are in the natural world (mass) density patterns, charge density patterns, 
electromagnetic field strength patterns, and other kinds of objective spatial property patterns. 
Most of them seem to lend themselves to representation by means of subjective colour 
patterns. 
In passing I want to remark that all physical properties cannot constitute property 
patterns. Mass, in contradistinction to mass density, cannot. But that is a problem I have 
pursued elsewhere (see [2] chapter 4, and [3]). 1 
4 The conventionality of spatial patterns 
There are in the world not only on the one hand mind-independent phenomena and on the 
other hand mind-dependent phenomena, there are fusions of mind-independent and mind-
dependent phenomena as well. A special kind of such fusions occur when, by a man-made 
decision, some mind-independent entity is divided into parts. The ownership of a bit of land 
is such a fusion. Although the land in itself is mind-independent, the borders are man-made 
and in that sense conventional. An estate is afiat object with a fiat boundary. (The concept 
of fiat objects and boundaries is taken from some of B. Smith's papers; see e.g [5].) 
Conventions can exist in relation to both mind-dependent and mind-independent 
phenomena. Phenomenal colours, to take an example, are subjective, but the property-
grounded relations they ground are objective. (Objective grounded relations can be grounded 
in subjective phenomena.) The property-grounded relations of similarity and dissimilarity 
among phenomenal colour hues can constitute a scale, the spectrum. And, trivially, the 
spectrum can be conventionally divided into a number of colour hues. Likewise, the density 
scale can be conventionally divided into, for example, very low density, low density, mean 
density, high density, and very high density. Continuous scales contain no natural borders. 
Therefore, for pragmatic reasons, consciously, half-consciously or unconsciously we create 
fiat boundaries. 
Like continuous scales, mind-independent spatial property patterns have no natural 
borders. Since zero density can be part of density patterns, the whole universe may be said to 
make up one spatial density pattern. All objective spatial property patterns are merely parts of 
the corresponding pattern of the universe. A specific density instance, on the other hand, has 
a natural border. It ends where another density is instantiated. But, obviously, a density 
pattern can not end in this way. The density on the other side of the presumed border can 
very well be made part of the pattern. The borders of ordinary spatial mind-independent 
patterns cannot but be conventional. Or, in other words: Spatial mind-independent patterns 
(which are smaller than the whole universe) are fiat objects. 
This conventionality highlights the spatial unity spoken of in claim number four. In fact, 
it is the unity of space itself which creates the unity of each spatial pattern. I have taken a so-
called container conception of space for granted (see [2] chapter 10), and in such a space pure 
spatial parts are necessarily fiat parts. Such a space is neither constituted by relations 
between things or events in space, nor by its parts since the parts have no identity of their 
own. The parts exist merely as parts of space. The conventional border of a pattern does not 
create the unity within the border. It merely "carves out" a part of space which already has 
unity, and that unity "unites" all the included properties-with-shapes and all their relations 
into a spatial property pattern. 
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The (sixth) claim that mind-independent spatial patterns can be represented by mind-
dependent spatial patterns, relies on the fact that the space of visual perception is unity-
creating in the same way as objective space is. 
Mind-dependent spatial patterns, like the chessboard pattern, are conventional, too. But 
they can be conventional in a, so to speak, natural way. As Gestalt psychology once made 
clear, our perceptual system construes unities. And, obviously, this applies to perceptions of 
patterns. Therefore, visual patterns can (falsely') appear as naturally given "brute facts". 
What our perceptual system does in relation to mind-dependent patterns, our cognitive system 
has w do in relation to mind-independent patterns. 
In thought we are able to transcend perceptually given pattern borders. Assume for 
instance that the chessboard I have talked about is lying on a table. In thought we can then 
choose the table as the border, and if we do, we will get another colour pattern. If we choose 
the room in which the table is placed as the border, we will get still another pattern. And so 
on. The border of the chessboard pattern must be regarded as conventional. Except for the 
universe as a whole. it is true that: 
7. Spatial patterns are necessarily fiat ohjects. 
The claims number seven and number four should be seen in the light of each other. 
Spatial patterns need both a delimitation and a unification. A delimitation of instances of 
properties-with-shapes without any unification would give us an aggregate, not a pattern. 
Spatial unification without delimitation would give us the universe only. 
S Spatiotemporal patterns 
A spatial pattern can exist as a whole. but this is not possible for a temporal pattern which 
extends beyond "the now". The past no longer exists, and the future has not yet come into 
existence. Nonetheless we can represent time by means of a spatial line, and we can imagine 
and think of temporal patterns in analogy with spatial patterns. 
Consider again the chessboard, but now imagine that the squares, as time goes by, are 
changing colours, and that they change in such a way that at every moment there is a 
chessboard pattern. In time, this spatial pattern gives rise to a temporal pattern. This 
chessboard pattern with its colour changes is a spatiotemporal colour pattern. If the colours 
are seen as representing different densities. then we have a spatiotemporal density pattern. 
A lot of other but similar patterns can jusst as easily be thought of. Above, we had (a) 
non-changing shapes but changing colours, but we can also (b) keep the colours constant and 
let the shapes of the pattern vary with time. We can (c) let both the colours and the shapes 
vary with time. Still another opportunity is (d) to keep both the shapes and the colours of the 
squares constant, but let them move around with time. We then get a movement pattern. The 
last thought experiment becomes easier if one thinks of each square as a thing. Such 
spatiotemporal patterns make up the non-causal part of mechanisms. Think for instance of 
the clockwork. 
The complexity of spatiotemporal patterns can be even greater. Try to think of a case (e) 
where the components of the pattern are moving and changing their shapes, while at the same 
time changing some of their other properties too. 
(Real spatiotemporal patterns have of course causes, but that fact does not make it 
impossible to describe the patterns independently of their causes. I have in another paper, [4], 
argued that if the causes of mechanisms are abstracted away, then one can study mechanism 
geometry in a way similar to classical purely spatial geometry.) 
The seven "spatial pattern truths" I have put forward can be transformed into the 
following corresponding "spatiotemporal pattern truths". Some of them need a comment, 
but some, I hope, need not. 
I. A spatiotemporal property pattern contains properties-with-shapes that are either 
changing properties, or changini shapes, or moving; this gives rise to spatiotemporal 
shapes. 
Comment: Spatiotemporal shapes can be four-dimensional. A two-dimensional chessboard 
square which continuously changes shape into a circle, gives rise to a three-dimensional 
spatial and temporal shape: a cube which continuously changes shape into a sphere, gives rise 
92 I. Johansson I Pattern as an Ontological Category 
to a four-dimensional spatiotemporal shape. 
2. A spatiotemporal property pattern contains a lot of property-grounded relations, but it 
is not identical with a set or an aggregate of such relations; the instantiations of these 
relations can he hoth .1patially and temporally scattered. 
3. A spatiotemporal property pattern contains a lot of both spatial and temporal 
relations, hut it is not identical with a set or an aggregate of such relations. 
4. A spatiotemporal property pattern contains a specific kind of spatial unity and a 
specific kind of temporal unity. 
Comment: The spatial unity is the same as earlier described. Time, however, has not the same 
kind of unity, since it is only "the now" which exists. Since this paper is not a paper in the 
philosophy of time, I will rest content with two remarks. (i) Temporal unity is not a really 
existing unity: in one sense it is an imagined and fiat unity, but in another sense it is not an 
imagined unity since the imagined events have had existence. (ii) When we represent time as 
a spatial line, our representation of time inherits the kind of unity which space has. This 
means, among other things, that, as spatial patterns are necessarily "one-piece and no-hole" 
areas or volumes, (spatio)temporal patterns cannot possibly have temporal holes. If, to take 
an example, a square during t 1 tot, changes shape into a circle, next, from t, to t1 remains a 
circle, and from t1 to t4 changes -into an ellipse, then the non-change be-tween t2 and t, 
becomes part of the temporal pattern, too. If this non-change is not regarded as part of the 
pattern, then we would have one pattern between 11 and t2, and another pattern between t1 
and t4 . The first pattern can not be connected with the last pattern into one single pattern 
without bringing in also what happens during 12 to t 1• Therefore, I regard time as unity-
creating in about the same way as container space is unity-creating. 
5. The t_vpe-identity of' a spatiotelll/}()rlll property pattern is independent of 
spatiotemporal si::e. 
Comment: Both specific kinds of changes and specific kinds of movements can take place in 
a longer or a shorter temporal interval: both of them have a change intensity. Just as a purely 
spatial pattern can be spatially diminished without losing its qualitative identity, a 
spatiotemporal pattern can be spatiotcmporally diminished without losing its qualitative 
identity. 
6. Mind-independent spatiotemporal patterns can he represented by mind-dependent 
spatiotemporal patterns. 
7. Spatiotemporal patterns are necessarily .fiat ohjects. 
Comment: This claim is a corollary of what was said about spatiotemporal unity in the 
comment to the fourth claim, and what was earlier said about fiat objects. Spatiotemporally 
based unities have no natural boundaries, except, of course, the universe and its whole 
history: if that totality has boundaries. Taking the peculiarity of time's existence into account, 
one might say that spatiotemporal patterns arc more fiat than purely spatial patterns because 
they are more dependent upon subjective representation. 
6 Causal systems 
In order for a pattern to exist, a unity must be created. In spatial patterns this unity arises 
thanks to the unity of space and a fiat delimitation of one part of space; in spatiotemporal 
patterns the unity arises thanks to a spatiotemporal unity and a fiat delimitation. What 
distinguishes causal patterns (=systems) from spatial and spatiotemporal patterns is primarily 
the way their unity is created. 
Let us imagine an old wire-based telephone system in a little village with fifteen 
cottages. The components of this causal system are fifteen telephone apparatuses, a telephone 
exchange, and the telephone-wires. All the components are things with properties. Scattered 
in these components there are a lot of property-grounded relations, and between them there 
are a lot of spatiotemporal relations. Metaphorically, on top of this there are a lot of causal 
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relations. However, as I have shown before, neither a set nor an aggregate of relations can 
create the necessary unity; that now the relevant relations are causal makes no difference to 
my arguments. 
The unity of the imagined telephone system can neither consist in the unity of actual 
causal interaction nor in merely the spatiotemporal unity of the system. Firstly, the 
telephone system exists even when nobody is using it, i.e. it exists even when there is no 
actual causal interaction among the components. Secondly, there is a telephone system even if 
the wired system is replaced by a radio telephone system, and when such a system is not 
used the components exist merely as an aggregate. There are then no spatial connections 
between the components. 
My conclusion is that causal systems get their identity from some kind of possible 
causal interaction. Realism with regards to causal systems requires both a realist view of 
causality and a belief in de re possibility. Since these are big philosophical issues in 
themselves, they cannot be dealt with here. There is only space for confession: In both 
respects I am a believer. 
A telephone which is not connected by a wire to any of the other fifteen telephones 
cannot be used for making calls within the system, and cannot therefore be part of this causal 
system. Nonetheless, this telephone may causally effect the system in some other way which 
is not part of the functioning of the telephone system. For instance, someone may take this 
phone and throw it at a functioning phone, and so make the whole phone system non-
functioning. In fact, most things on earth seem, in some far-fetched way or other, to be able 
to affect each other. Therefore, the unity of a causal system is always a unity of certain 
kinds of causal interactions. 
The kinds of possible causal interactions which constitute a causal system have to be 
chosen from all the possible ones. This means that every causal system is a fiat system. By 
fiat we decide to focus attention only on some kinds of interactions. However, as remarked 
before, conventionality can fuse with mind-independent phenomena. The "fiatness" of causal 
systems, just like the "fiatness" of spatial patterns, does not cancel mind-independence. 
When, now, 1 am once again listing my "seven pillars of pattern wisdom", I will, in 
order to be brief, do it with only one comment. 
1. A causal system contains things with properties and corresponding spatial and 
spatiotemporal patterns. 
2. A causal system contains a lot olproperty-grounded relations, but it is not identical 
with a set or an aggregate ol such relations. 
3. A causal system contains a lot of both spatial, temporal, and causal relations, but it is 
not identical with a set or an aggregate of such relations. 
4. A causal system contains a specific kind of causal unity. 
5. The type-identity of a causal system is independent of its spatiotemporal size. 
6. Causal systems can he represented by mind-dependent patterns. 
7. Causal systems are fiat objects. 
Once again I would like to say that the claims number seven and number four should 
be seen in the light of each other. Causal systems need both a delimitation and a unification. 
A delimitation of causal components without any unification would give us an aggregate, not 
a system. Causal unification without delimitation would afford us with incomprehensibly 
large systems. 
7 Degrees of self-sufficiency and degrees of fiatness 
I have distinguished three species of the category of pattern.4 Often, when there is talk of 
4 In fact, I think there are four. If one believes, as I do, that intentional states cannot be identical with pure 
causal and functional data processing systems, then there is still another important species of the category of 
pattern, intentionality. As I hope is clear by now, what really differentiates the species of patterns is their 
unity-making factor. In my view, intentionality can be unity-making, just like space, time, and causality can. 
A group of people who mutually perceive each other, or talk with each other, make up a system which is 
different in character from a purely causal system. The unity of this system is created by nested intentionality. 
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species and genera, as in botany taxonomy, the species come out as logically independent of 
each other. They exist, one may say, side by side. But this is not true for the species of 
pattern. There is a kind of order of existential dependence among the unity-making factors. In 
my view, causality requires spatiotemporality, and, of course, spatiotemporality requires 
spatiality; but not the other way round. 
Spatial unity is more existentially self-sufficient than spatiotemporal unity, which, in 
turn, is more self-sufficient than causal unity. This order is an order among the "fiat-
independent" factor of a pattern unity. However, it may well be argued that this order implies 
a corresponding ordering of and degrees of fiatness. That is: spatial patterns are less fiat than 
spatiotemporal patterns which are less fiat than causal systems'. But all of them can, 
independently of their degree of fiatness, have a mind-independent part. 
Pattern realism is true. There are patterns and systems in the world. 
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